Description
In the vulnerability-lookup web application, the authentication decorators for feed-key requests (auth_feedkey_func in website/decorators.py) and API-key requests (auth_func in website/web/api/v1/common.py) called Flask-Login's login_user() function. This caused the HTTP response to a request authenticated solely by a feed key (supplied as the X-FEED-KEY URL parameter) or an API key (supplied as the X-API-KEY header) to set a session cookie that grants full authenticated access to every page in the application, without requiring a password or two-factor authentication.

The practical impact is that any party possessing a leaked feed URL (a common occurrence, as feed URLs are shared with RSS readers) or an API key could obtain a valid web session for the associated account. This session provides access to the user's account page, which exposes the API key and other profile data, and for accounts with the administrator role, access to the /admin interface, enabling full administrative control of the application.

The vulnerability affects all users whose feed key or API key is exposed. No prior authentication, user interaction, or special network conditions are required; a single HTTP request with the token is sufficient to establish the session. The session persists until it expires, and because it is not bound to the original credential (a related CWE-613 issue noted by the developers), revoking the feed key or API key does not invalidate the already-created session.

The fix replaces the login_user() call with assignment to g._login_user, which Flask-Login's current_user property reads for the current request only, without writing any session cookie. The affected views remain unchanged and continue to see the authenticated user for the single request.
Published: 2026-11-16
Score: 7.8 High
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
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Remediation

Vendor Solution

The authentication decorators for feed-key and API-key requests no longer call Flask-Login's login_user(), which was writing the authenticated user into the session cookie and creating a full web session. Instead, the user object is now stored on Flask's request-scoped g._login_user attribute, which Flask-Login's current_user property reads first. This authenticates only the current request without setting any session cookie, preventing a limited-scope token from being elevated to a persistent, all-pages session that bypasses password and two-factor authentication.

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History

Mon, 16 Nov 2026 08:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the vulnerability-lookup web application, the authentication decorators for feed-key requests (auth_feedkey_func in website/decorators.py) and API-key requests (auth_func in website/web/api/v1/common.py) called Flask-Login's login_user() function. This caused the HTTP response to a request authenticated solely by a feed key (supplied as the X-FEED-KEY URL parameter) or an API key (supplied as the X-API-KEY header) to set a session cookie that grants full authenticated access to every page in the application, without requiring a password or two-factor authentication. The practical impact is that any party possessing a leaked feed URL (a common occurrence, as feed URLs are shared with RSS readers) or an API key could obtain a valid web session for the associated account. This session provides access to the user's account page, which exposes the API key and other profile data, and for accounts with the administrator role, access to the /admin interface, enabling full administrative control of the application. The vulnerability affects all users whose feed key or API key is exposed. No prior authentication, user interaction, or special network conditions are required; a single HTTP request with the token is sufficient to establish the session. The session persists until it expires, and because it is not bound to the original credential (a related CWE-613 issue noted by the developers), revoking the feed key or API key does not invalidate the already-created session. The fix replaces the login_user() call with assignment to g._login_user, which Flask-Login's current_user property reads for the current request only, without writing any session cookie. The affected views remain unchanged and continue to see the authenticated user for the single request.
Title vulnerability-lookup: Feed key or API key authentication creates full web session bypassing password and 2FA
First Time appeared Vulnerability-lookup
Vulnerability-lookup vulnerability-lookup
Weaknesses CWE-287
CWE-613
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:vulnerability-lookup:vulnerability-lookup:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Vulnerability-lookup
Vulnerability-lookup vulnerability-lookup
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 7.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N'}


Subscriptions

Vulnerability-lookup Vulnerability-lookup
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: CIRCL

Published:

Updated: 2026-11-16T08:36:51.005Z

Reserved: 2026-11-16T08:36:44.944Z

Link: CVE-2026-129703

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-11-16T09:17:13.293

Modified: 2026-11-16T09:17:13.293

Link: CVE-2026-129703

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-11-16T10:00:09Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-287

    Improper Authentication

  • CWE-613

    Insufficient Session Expiration