Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: don't let the extent type hide an exhausted free-space table extent
udf_table_new_block() takes the first block of the free-space table
extent closest to the goal. It keeps that extent's type and length
together in goal_elen, subtracts one block, and deletes the extent only
if goal_elen then reaches zero. UDF 2.60 section 2.3.7.1 requires the
free-space extents of an Unallocated Space Entry to be of type 1
(allocated but not recorded), and mkudffs writes them that way. For
such an extent the type bits keep goal_elen non-zero, so taking its last
block leaves a type-1 extent of length zero behind, starting at the
block after the extent, which is in use.
The next allocation that picks this empty extent returns that in-use
block. Subtracting a block from 0x40000000 then borrows from the type
bits, and the extent becomes type 0 with a length of 2^30 - blocksize:
about a gigabyte of "free" space overlapping live metadata, the other
table extents and whatever lies behind the partition. From then on
blocks are handed out twice, or past the end of the partition.
Extents that udf_table_free_blocks() adds are type 0, where the check
works, so only tables written by mkudffs or by another implementation
are affected. Nothing more than filling such a filesystem is needed:
on a fresh 1 MiB "mkudffs --space=unalloctable" image, creating empty
files until the partition is full writes file entries over the reserve
volume descriptor sequence and the backup anchor, and df then reports a
negative amount of used space.
On syzbot's images the same double allocation is what the two reports
below trip over. In the first, ftruncate() extends a new file with
enough hole extents to need a chain of allocation extent descriptors;
one AED is placed on another inode's file entry, and a later one is
placed on the block of the AED currently being filled, which
udf_setup_indirect_aext() zeroes, so __udf_add_aext() finds
lengthAllocDescs out of step with its cursor. In the second, an AED
is placed past the end of the device, sb_getblk() fails, and the error
path of udf_do_extend_file() calls udf_truncate_extents() on an extent
list that no longer covers i_size.
Keep the type separately from the length, as udf_table_prealloc_blocks()
already does.
udf: don't let the extent type hide an exhausted free-space table extent
udf_table_new_block() takes the first block of the free-space table
extent closest to the goal. It keeps that extent's type and length
together in goal_elen, subtracts one block, and deletes the extent only
if goal_elen then reaches zero. UDF 2.60 section 2.3.7.1 requires the
free-space extents of an Unallocated Space Entry to be of type 1
(allocated but not recorded), and mkudffs writes them that way. For
such an extent the type bits keep goal_elen non-zero, so taking its last
block leaves a type-1 extent of length zero behind, starting at the
block after the extent, which is in use.
The next allocation that picks this empty extent returns that in-use
block. Subtracting a block from 0x40000000 then borrows from the type
bits, and the extent becomes type 0 with a length of 2^30 - blocksize:
about a gigabyte of "free" space overlapping live metadata, the other
table extents and whatever lies behind the partition. From then on
blocks are handed out twice, or past the end of the partition.
Extents that udf_table_free_blocks() adds are type 0, where the check
works, so only tables written by mkudffs or by another implementation
are affected. Nothing more than filling such a filesystem is needed:
on a fresh 1 MiB "mkudffs --space=unalloctable" image, creating empty
files until the partition is full writes file entries over the reserve
volume descriptor sequence and the backup anchor, and df then reports a
negative amount of used space.
On syzbot's images the same double allocation is what the two reports
below trip over. In the first, ftruncate() extends a new file with
enough hole extents to need a chain of allocation extent descriptors;
one AED is placed on another inode's file entry, and a later one is
placed on the block of the AED currently being filled, which
udf_setup_indirect_aext() zeroes, so __udf_add_aext() finds
lengthAllocDescs out of step with its cursor. In the second, an AED
is placed past the end of the device, sb_getblk() fails, and the error
path of udf_do_extend_file() calls udf_truncate_extents() on an extent
list that no longer covers i_size.
Keep the type separately from the length, as udf_table_prealloc_blocks()
already does.
Published:
2026-11-20
Score:
n/a
EPSS:
n/a
KEV:
No
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Remediation
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
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Tracking
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Advisories
No advisories yet.
References
History
Fri, 20 Nov 2026 06:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udf: don't let the extent type hide an exhausted free-space table extent udf_table_new_block() takes the first block of the free-space table extent closest to the goal. It keeps that extent's type and length together in goal_elen, subtracts one block, and deletes the extent only if goal_elen then reaches zero. UDF 2.60 section 2.3.7.1 requires the free-space extents of an Unallocated Space Entry to be of type 1 (allocated but not recorded), and mkudffs writes them that way. For such an extent the type bits keep goal_elen non-zero, so taking its last block leaves a type-1 extent of length zero behind, starting at the block after the extent, which is in use. The next allocation that picks this empty extent returns that in-use block. Subtracting a block from 0x40000000 then borrows from the type bits, and the extent becomes type 0 with a length of 2^30 - blocksize: about a gigabyte of "free" space overlapping live metadata, the other table extents and whatever lies behind the partition. From then on blocks are handed out twice, or past the end of the partition. Extents that udf_table_free_blocks() adds are type 0, where the check works, so only tables written by mkudffs or by another implementation are affected. Nothing more than filling such a filesystem is needed: on a fresh 1 MiB "mkudffs --space=unalloctable" image, creating empty files until the partition is full writes file entries over the reserve volume descriptor sequence and the backup anchor, and df then reports a negative amount of used space. On syzbot's images the same double allocation is what the two reports below trip over. In the first, ftruncate() extends a new file with enough hole extents to need a chain of allocation extent descriptors; one AED is placed on another inode's file entry, and a later one is placed on the block of the AED currently being filled, which udf_setup_indirect_aext() zeroes, so __udf_add_aext() finds lengthAllocDescs out of step with its cursor. In the second, an AED is placed past the end of the device, sb_getblk() fails, and the error path of udf_do_extend_file() calls udf_truncate_extents() on an extent list that no longer covers i_size. Keep the type separately from the length, as udf_table_prealloc_blocks() already does. | |
| Title | udf: don't let the extent type hide an exhausted free-space table extent | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-20T05:49:27.678Z
Reserved: 2026-09-25T10:25:14.424Z
Link: CVE-2026-99602
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-11-20T06:17:52.237
Modified: 2026-11-20T06:17:52.237
Link: CVE-2026-99602
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
No weakness.