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Wed, 11 Nov 2026 18:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Probo is a self-hostable governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) platform built for engineering and security teams. Prior to version 0.224.0, the public Trust Center GraphQL API exposes acceptElectronicSignature and recordSigningEvent, both gated only by @authentication(required: PRESENT) @sessionOnly — any self-provisioned trust center identity can call them. The underlying esign.Service.AcceptSignature and esign.Service.recordEvent build the tenant scope from the client-supplied signatureId GID (coredata.NewScopeFromObjectID(req.SignatureID)) and load the signature by that GID. At no point do they verify that the signature belongs to the caller or that the caller's email matches the signature's SignerEmail. As a result, any authenticated trust-center visitor who possesses another visitor's signature GID can: (1) complete that visitor's NDA signature — overwriting signer name/IP/UA with attacker data and setting status to Accepted, which triggers the sealing worker to generate a completion certificate; (2) inject arbitrary audit-trail events into any signature's log. Both attacks defeat the non-repudiation and integrity guarantees of the e-signature system. This issue has been patched in version 0.224.0. | |
| Title | Probo: Broken access control in public e-signature API | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-639 CWE-862 |
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cvssV3_1
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Subscriptions
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-11T18:09:39.540Z
Reserved: 2026-08-18T21:17:32.200Z
Link: CVE-2026-76078
No data.
Status : Deferred
Published: 2026-11-11T19:17:44.550
Modified: 2026-11-11T19:17:44.690
Link: CVE-2026-76078
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OpenCVE Enrichment
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