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Search Results (4 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-120337 | 1 Vstarcam | 1 O-kam Superipcam | 2026-11-02 | 7.3 High |
| A vulnerability was determined in VStarcam O-KAM SuperIPCam 1.3.3.32. Affected by this issue is the function FUN_005a2d44 of the file SuperIPCam.exe of the component P2P Session Teardown. This manipulation causes use after free. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. | ||||
| CVE-2026-120336 | 1 Vstarcam | 1 O-kam Client | 2026-11-02 | 7.3 High |
| A vulnerability was found in VStarcam O-KAM Client 1.3.3.32. Affected by this vulnerability is the function FUN_10003EA0 in the library DevDll_925.dll. The manipulation results in stack-based buffer overflow. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. | ||||
| CVE-2019-12288 | 2 Vstarcam, Vstracm | 4 C7824iwp, C7824iwp Firmware, C38s and 1 more | 2024-11-21 | 9.8 Critical |
| An issue was discovered in upgrade_htmls.cgi on VStarcam 100T (C7824WIP) KR75.8.53.20 and 200V (C38S) KR203.18.1.20 devices. The web service, network, and account files can be manipulated through a web UI firmware update without any authentication. The attacker can achieve access to the device through a manipulated web UI firmware update. | ||||
| CVE-2019-11014 | 1 Vstarcam | 1 Eye4 | 2024-11-21 | N/A |
| The VStarCam vstc.vscam.client library and vstc.vscam shared object, as used in the Eye4 application (for Android, iOS, and Windows), do not prevent spoofing of the camera server. An attacker can create a fake camera server that listens for the client looking for a camera on the local network. When the camera responds to the client, it responds via the broadcast address, giving all information necessary to impersonate the camera. The attacker then floods the client with responses, causing the original camera to be denied service from the client, and thus causing the client to then communicate exclusively with the attacker's fake camera server. When connecting to the fake camera server, the client sends all details necessary to login to the camera (username and password). | ||||
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