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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-107441 | 2026-11-03 | 8.8 High | ||
| An out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the CGI program of Zyxel GS1900-24E firmware versions through 2.90(AAHK.2)C0 could allow an unauthenticated adjacent attacker to exploit the flaw and potentially execute OS commands via a crafted HTTP request. | ||||
| CVE-2026-118009 | 1 Mozilla | 1 Firefox | 2026-11-03 | 7.5 High |
| Integer overflow, use-after-free in the Graphics: Text component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 159 and Thunderbird 159. | ||||
| CVE-2026-118012 | 1 Mozilla | 1 Firefox | 2026-11-03 | 7.5 High |
| Use-after-free in the DOM: Animation component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 159 and Thunderbird 159. | ||||
| CVE-2026-79589 | 1 U-speed | 1 N300 Router | 2026-11-03 | 9.8 Critical |
| The WIFI4 N300 router (Model: T1 Pro) v1.0.0 by U-speed contains an insecure access control flaw that allows an attacker to gain unauthenticated root shell. The vulnerability is caused by the exposure of the UART debugging interface having a lack of authentication, authorization and access control functionality. Once the interface is soldered and connected to the attacker, they gain root privilege to the system. | ||||
| CVE-2026-107024 | 2026-11-03 | 7.5 High | ||
| Insecure permissions in Share 2 Archive Today versionCode 61 allows unauthorized attackers to arbitrarily overwrite another user's clipboard content via supplying a crafted URL. | ||||
| CVE-2026-107029 | 2026-11-03 | 9.1 Critical | ||
| Insecure permissions in rubenalfon Pile v1.1.3 allows unauthorized attackers to invoke an exported component, leading to arbitrary data access and overwriting. | ||||
| CVE-2026-107035 | 2026-11-03 | 6.5 Medium | ||
| Insecure permissions in the object/Page.java component of MBasov OMN Outline notes Markdown versionCode 3400 allows unauthorized attackers to arbitrarily write content into another user's private storage via a crafted payload. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99235 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Save the event file instead of the compatible histogram create_field_var_hist() creates a histogram on the matched event to supply a field variable, and records it on the target so it can be torn down later: hist_data = find_compatible_hist(target_hist_data, file); ... /* Save the compatible histogram information */ var_hist->hist_data = hist_data; hist_data is not the histogram it creates. It is one that was already there, whose keys the new one copies. The saved pointer has a single user, unregister_field_var_hists(), which runs when the target is removed: file = hist_data->field_var_hists[i]->hist_data->event_file; find_compatible_hist() matches on keys alone, so it can pick one with no variables of its own. check_var_refs() then returns false and the user can remove it while the target still points at it: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in event_hist_trigger_free+0x2b2/0x320 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880093b90e0 by task init/1 Freed by task 1: kfree+0x154/0x420 event_hist_trigger_free+0x1d5/0x320 event_hist_trigger_parse+0x35f3/0x69e0 trigger_process_regex+0x1a6/0x250 Save the event file instead. It is all the dereference ever wanted, and it does not go away when the user removes a trigger. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99069 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: ati_remote2 - fix type confusion in device attribute handlers Previously, the channel_mask and mode_mask attributes were registered on the parent usb_device via sysfs_create_group(). When commit b20d6bf8014b ("Input: ati-remote2 - use driver core to instantiate device attributes") converted the driver to let the driver core manage them via dev_groups in struct usb_driver, the attributes moved to the bound usb_interface devices, but the show and store callbacks were not updated accordingly. As a result, the callbacks still invoked to_usb_device() on a device pointer belonging to a struct usb_interface, producing an invalid usb_device pointer. Use to_usb_interface() directly in the attribute handlers to obtain the interface and its driver data. | ||||
| CVE-2026-118025 | 1 Mozilla | 1 Firefox | 2026-11-03 | 6.1 Medium |
| Other issue in the SVG component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 159 and Thunderbird 159. | ||||
| CVE-2026-58829 | 1 Google | 1 Android | 2026-11-03 | 8.4 High |
| In fuse_backing_mmap of backing.c, there is a possible memory corruption due to a use after free. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-111464 | 2026-11-03 | 5.9 Medium | ||
| The WP Fastest Cache plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 1.5.3. The plugin caches the response of Core’s wp-activate.php without honoring its no-store/no-cache headers, the wp-activate-* cookie, or the WP_INSTALLING state, writing the credential-bearing activation response to a publicly accessible cache file. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to retrieve the plaintext username and twelve-character password of the most recently activated Multisite registrant from that cached wp-activate.php response. Exploitation requires a Multisite subdirectory installation with public user and site registration enabled, and the credentials are only exposed after a genuine registrant follows their activation link. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99076 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-03 | 3.7 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: udp: Create exceptions before socket matching Currently, when ICMPv6 Packet Too Big and Redirect Message packets are locally delivered and quote a UDP packet, an exception is only created in the IPv6 exception cache if the kernel can match the UDP packet to an existing socket. This behavior allows off-path attackers to conduct a side-channel attack on the exception cache in order to discover the ephemeral port used by a connected UDP socket. Commit 4785305c05b2 ("ipv6: use siphash in rt6_exception_hash()") and commit a00df2caffed ("ipv6: make exception cache less predictible") tried to mitigate such attacks by making it harder for attackers to discover hash collisions in the exception cache and by randomizing the number of exceptions a hash bucket can hold, respectively. Unfortunately, both of the mitigations can be bypassed. Instead, mitigate such attacks by always creating an exception, even before trying to find a matching socket. Do that by calling ip6_update_pmtu() and ip6_redirect(), the helpers used when the quoted packet did not originate from a socket. This means that guesses (right or wrong) from an off-path attacker will always result in an exception being created or updated in the cache that the attacker can observe. Pass the ifindex of the ingress device and the default uid, in a similar fashion to icmpv6_err(). Unlike IPv4, an oif of 0 would not match any nexthop in ip6_redirect_nh_match() and no exception would be created in response to a Redirect Message. Note that this does not allow attackers to create exceptions that they could not create before, as both helpers can already be reached with little to no validation. For example, by sending an ICMPv6 error that quotes an ICMPv6 Echo Reply or one that quotes a UDP source port that matches a wildcard socket. Also note that in the good case (matched socket) the above scheme comes at the cost of an extra route lookup, as the no socket helpers perform their own lookup before the one performed by ip6_sk_update_pmtu() / ip6_sk_redirect(). When the two resolve to different nexthops, it also results in two exceptions being created for the same destination IP. One in the exception cache of the nexthop resolved by the no socket helpers and another in the exception cache of the nexthop used by the socket. | ||||
| CVE-2026-118011 | 1 Mozilla | 1 Firefox | 2026-11-03 | 7.5 High |
| Frame poisoning in the CSS Parsing and Computation component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 159 and Thunderbird 159. | ||||
| CVE-2026-118018 | 1 Mozilla | 1 Firefox | 2026-11-03 | 6.1 Medium |
| Spoofing issue in the Downloads component in Firefox for Android. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 159. | ||||
| CVE-2026-107018 | 2026-11-03 | 8.1 High | ||
| Insecure permissions in Ghost Commander File Manager versionCode 479 allows unauthorized attackers to arbitrarily read and write files inside the commander's private storage. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99217 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-03 | 4.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fork: release the files of a failed fork after sched_cancel_fork() Reorder copy_process() cleanup so sched_fork() taking scx_fork_rwsem scx_pre_fork() is safe and isn't held around exiting files. Right now, a fork that fails while another thread closed the bpf link fd will deadlock against its own read side. It also blocks every fork on the system: copy_process() holds scx_fork_rwsem for read exit_files() close_files() filp_close_sync() bpf_scx_unreg() kthread_flush_work() waits for the disable work scx_root_disable() percpu_down_write(&scx_fork_rwsem) Simply release the child's files after sched_cancel_fork() dropped the lock. The task starts out as a copy of its parent so p->files points to the parent's table until copy_files() replaces it. exit_files() must not run for a fork that failed before that. Clear p->files up front so exit_files() is a no-op for those and make copy_files() set it explicitly for CLONE_FILES. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99231 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/waitid: own the request before clearing ->head io_waitid_remove_wq() only takes the wait queue lock if ->head is set. io_waitid_wait() clears ->head first thing, before it tries to become the owner of the request by bumping ->refs. If somebody else owns the request at that point, nothing keeps it from completing the request while the wake up handler is still going to touch it: CPU0 (io_waitid_wait) CPU1 (io_waitid, holds a ref) list_del_init(&wait->entry) smp_store_release(&iw->head, NULL) __do_wait() finds another child io_waitid_remove_wq() // ->head == NULL, no locking io_waitid_finish(), IOU_COMPLETE // request freed and reused atomic_fetch_inc(&iw->refs) The same goes for __io_waitid_cancel() if it claims the request in that window. ->refs is part of the per opcode data of the request, so this increments whatever the next user of the request keeps there. If that happens to be zero, the handler concludes that it owns the request, and queues io_waitid_cb() for it. With the window held open by a delay, and the request reused for a receive that is waiting for data: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __wake_up_common+0x1ca/0x1f0 __wake_up_sync_key+0x36/0x50 sock_def_readable+0xf1/0x420 unix_stream_sendmsg+0x60b/0x1110 Allocated by task 87: io_arm_apoll+0x1ed/0x940 Freed by task 87: __io_submit_flush_completions+0x118d/0x1a10 tctx_task_work_run+0x327/0x950 Only clear ->head once the handler owns the request. If it doesn't, the owner finds ->head set and has to wait for the lock, which is held by the caller of the handler. Deleting the already deleted entry again is harmless. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99233 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing/histograms: Verify event_call identity when updating synth_event refcount In event_hist_trigger_parse() and hist_unreg_all(), the histogram registration and unregistration paths look up find_synth_event() using trace_event_name(file->event_call) and adjust se->ref if a match is found. Because find_synth_event() only compares the event basename, registering or removing a histogram on a non-synthetic trace event whose basename matches a synthetic event erroneously modifies the synthetic event's reference count. If a histogram is registered on the non-synthetic event before the synthetic event is created and removed afterwards, se->ref is decremented without a matching increment, allowing the synthetic event to be freed while an active histogram action still holds a pointer to it. Introduce find_synth_event_call() to verify that &se->call matches file->event_call before adjusting se->ref. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99239 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn l2cap_chan may be linked to l2cap_conn at most once. This is assumed in several places, eg l2cap_chan_del cleanup. There is a TOCTOU race where the invariant is violated: [Task 1] [Task 2] l2cap_chan_connect l2cap_sock_bind l2cap_chan_lock lock_sock l2cap_state_change if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN) chan->state = BT_CONNECT l2cap_sock_state_change_cb chan->state = BT_BOUND sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND lock_sock <------------------ release_sock sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT l2cap_sock_connect() does not check sk->sk_state, so since chan->state is now BT_BOUND, subsequent connect() ends up with second __l2cap_chan_add. Explicitly document and check the invariant in __l2cap_chan_add with WARN_ON_ONCE. The only callsite where it could be hit is l2cap_chan_connect, so add pre-check there to avoid relying on chan->state. chan->state read/write is not properly guarded currently so there can be other TOCTOUC problems. Add l2cap_lock_chan in l2cap_sock_bind() to guard chan->state write. | ||||