| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate directory-index entry counts when reading metadata
ocfs2_validate_dx_leaf() and ocfs2_validate_dx_root() check the ECC and
signature of an indexed-directory block before it reaches higher-level
callers, but neither validator bounds the ocfs2_dx_entry_list counts
against the capacity of the block that holds them.
ocfs2_dx_dir_search() then walks
for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(entry_list->de_num_used); i++)
dx_entry = &entry_list->de_entries[i];
over de_num_used entries with no bounds check. entry_list is either
dx_leaf->dl_list (from ocfs2_read_dx_leaf) or, for an inline root,
dx_root->dr_entries. A crafted on-disk image can set de_num_used (and
de_count, which is the __counted_by_le() bound of de_entries) to 0xffff
and make the walk read far past the end of the 4KB metadata block, giving
a slab out-of-bounds read reachable from any path lookup, stat() or open()
on an indexed directory once the image is mounted.
Commit 775c17386a6f ("ocfs2: validate dx_root extent list fields during
block read") already bounds dr_list for the non-inline dx_root, but left
the inline dr_entries path and the dx_leaf dl_list unchecked. Add the
same read-time validation for both entry lists: de_count must equal the
capacity of the block (ocfs2_dx_entries_per_leaf()/per_root()) and
de_num_used must not exceed de_count, rejecting corrupted metadata with
-EFSCORRUPTED before ocfs2_dx_dir_search() can walk an out-of-range entry
array.
de_count is always written as exactly the block capacity when a leaf or
inline root is formatted, so the equality check does not reject any valid
image.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: virtio - bound the akcipher result length
virtio_crypto_dataq_akcipher_callback() sets the result length from the
device-reported response length without bounding it to the destination
buffer, which was allocated for the original request length.
sg_copy_from_buffer() then reads that many bytes from the destination
buffer; a backend reporting a larger length over-reads adjacent kernel
heap into the caller's scatterlist (an out-of-bounds read).
Clamp the reported length to the originally requested destination length.
A conforming device reports no more than that, so valid results are
unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Add bounds check for CRAT subtype length
The CRAT parser validates that the subtype header fits within the image,
but does not verify that the advertised subtype length fits. A malformed
CRAT table with an oversized length field causes out-of-bounds reads when
kfd_parse_subtype() casts the header to specific subtype structures.
Add validation that sub_type_hdr + length does not exceed the image
boundary before parsing the subtype contents.
(cherry picked from commit 48e1d1e6e8798aef0312e68d8e586021b5b3cf4d) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: flowtable: avoid num_encaps underflow on bridge VLAN untag
The DEV_PATH_BR_VLAN_UNTAG case post-decrements info->num_encaps
inside WARN_ON_ONCE(). num_encaps is u8, so if it's already 0 the
decrement still happens and wraps it to 255. The break only leaves
the inner switch -- a later path entry can set info->indev back to
a real device, and we end up returning with num_encaps == 255.
nft_dev_forward_path() then walks info.encap[] (size 2) up to
num_encaps, which means an OOB stack read and a bogus count copied
into the route descriptor.
Should only happen on a malformed bridge path stack, hence the WARN,
but worth handling sanely. Move the decrement out of the WARN.
[ While at this, remove the WARN_ON_ONCE since this can only happen
with a buggy bridge path stack --pablo ]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: reject oversized IBs with per-ring packet limits
On GFX rings, amdgpu_cs_p2_ib() passed user-supplied ib_bytes through
to ib->length_dw without a limit, while ring_emit_ib() encodes length
into packet fields. Oversized values can corrupt adjacent control bits
and destabilize command submission.
Add a per-ring IB packet size limit helper and reject command
submissions exceeding the corresponding dword limit before IB
allocation. Use the documented 20-bit limit for GFX/compute/SDMA/VPE,
and apply the MM fallback limit for other ring types.
(cherry picked from commit 7f48fa2cf62e3fa6c9c3870aa74988f773247e52) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: revalidate ihl to prevent out-of-bounds access
While the outer IP header is already pulled into the skb head,
we must be careful and revalidate the embedded headers after
reading them from the skb frags to prevent out-of-bounds
access.
One such place reported by Sashiko is ip_vs_nat_icmp() where
local process can change the ihl field and after
skb_ensure_writable() we can see larger value which is a
problem for the ip_send_check(cih) calls.
Add check to drop the packet if the ihl field is changed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_u32: skip hash tables in u32_bind_class()
u32_walk() enumerates both struct tc_u_hnode and struct tc_u_knode
through the walker callback. u32_bind_class() unconditionally casts the
passed fh to tc_u_knode and accesses &n->res, so when fh is actually a
tc_u_hnode, which has no tcf_result member, this results in a
slab-out-of-bounds read of res->classid in tc_cls_bind_class().
The issue can be reproduced with the following commands:
tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: hfsc
tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:1 hfsc sc rate 1000kbit
tc filter add dev lo parent 1:1 protocol ip prio 1 u32 match u32 0 0 flowid 1:1
tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:2 hfsc sc rate 2000kbit
Fix this by skipping hash tables via the TC_U32_KEY(handle) check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
soc: aspeed: lpc-snoop: Fix usercopy overflow in snoop_file_read
put_fifo_with_discard() acts as both producer and consumer on the kfifo:
it calls kfifo_skip() (advances out) and kfifo_put() (advances in) from
the IRQ handler without synchronizing with snoop_file_read(), which also
consumes via kfifo_to_user(). On SMP systems this concurrent access can
leave (in - out) larger than the ring buffer, so __kfifo_to_user()'s clamp
to (in - out) is ineffective and kfifo_copy_to_user() can attempt a
copy_to_user() past the kmalloc-2k backing store:
usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object
'kmalloc-2k' (offset 0, size 2049)!
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c!
Call trace:
usercopy_abort
__check_heap_object
__check_object_size
kfifo_copy_to_user
__kfifo_to_user
snoop_file_read
vfs_read
Serialize kfifo access with a per-channel spinlock shared between the
IRQ handler (producer) and the file reader (consumer). Annotate @fifo
with __guarded_by(&lock) and opt the driver into context analysis so the
compiler enforces that all fifo access holds the lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: lzo: reject inline extents without valid headers
[BUG]
For a crafted btrfs image, the following KASAN can be triggered when
reading an inline lzo compressed file extent:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in lzo_decompress+0x57d/0x700
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888006f2e644 by task btrfs_lzo_inlin/77
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x70
print_report+0xd1/0x610
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
__asan_report_load_n_noabort+0x13/0x20
lzo_decompress+0x57d/0x700
btrfs_decompress+0x140/0x1c0
uncompress_inline+0x147/0x1b0
btrfs_get_extent+0xb23/0x10a0
btrfs_do_readpage.constprop.0+0x538/0x1ac0
btrfs_readahead+0x32f/0x5f0
read_pages+0x16f/0x850
page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x296/0x490
do_page_cache_ra+0xd9/0x130
page_cache_sync_ra+0x3ee/0x6f0
filemap_get_pages+0x306/0x15c0
filemap_read+0x329/0xd00
btrfs_file_read_iter+0x1f8/0x2b0
vfs_read+0x4ef/0x720
ksys_read+0xf8/0x1d0
__x64_sys_read+0x71/0xb0
x64_sys_call+0x1ab0/0x1b70
do_syscall_64+0x61/0x470
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
</TASK>
[CAUSE]
For an inline lzo compressed file extent, there should always be one lzo
header, recording the total length of the compressed data, followed by
one segment header, recording the compressed lzo payload.
But if a crafted inline lzo compressed file extent contains only an lzo
header, without the segment header or payload, lzo_decompress() will
still try to read the segment header, causing a read beyond the item
boundary.
Furthermore if the inline lzo compressed file extent is the first item
of the leaf, it will be at the extent buffer boundary. The above
out-of-boundary read will go beyond the extent buffer boundary,
triggering the above KASAN report.
[FIX]
Validate the total length of the inlined lzo compressed file extent, to
make sure there is at least one LZO header and one segment header, and a
non-zero payload.
[ Rework the commit message to remove slop ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/zcrypt: Close speculative mem read possibility
The domain value is extracted from a given CCA or EP11 ioctl struct
when a CPRB is about to be sent. Thus this is a user controlled value.
Under some special conditions (custom device node used, administrative
load) this value is used as an array index after bounds checking, but
without speculation barrier.
Add the missing array_index_nospec() call to prevent speculative
execution where this domain value is used. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate fast symlink target during inode read
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() already rejects several inconsistent
self-contained dinodes before they are exposed to the rest of the
filesystem. Fast symlinks need the same treatment.
A zero-cluster symlink is treated as a fast symlink and later read through
page_get_link() and ocfs2_fast_symlink_read_folio(). That path uses
strnlen() on the inline payload and then copies len + 1 bytes into the
folio. If a corrupt dinode stores an i_size that does not fit the inline
area or omits the terminating NUL at i_size, that copy reads past the end
of the inode block buffer.
Reject zero-cluster symlink dinodes whose i_size exceeds the inline
fast-symlink capacity or whose inline payload is not NUL-terminated
exactly at i_size when the inode block is validated. This keeps malformed
fast symlinks from reaching the read path.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN use-after-free in ocfs2_fast_symlink_read_folio+0x12c/0x1f0
RIP: 0033:0x7f5c6d859aa7
Read of size 3905
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?)
ocfs2_fast_symlink_read_folio+0x12c/0x1f0 (fs/ocfs2/inode.c:?)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
__virt_addr_valid+0x19f/0x330 (?:?)
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?)
kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 (?:?)
__asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 (?:?)
filemap_read_folio+0x27/0xe0 (?:?)
filemap_read_folio+0x35/0xe0 (?:?)
do_read_cache_folio+0x138/0x230 (?:?)
__page_get_link+0x26/0x110 (?:?)
page_get_link+0x2e/0x70 (?:?)
vfs_readlink+0x15e/0x250 (?:?)
touch_atime+0x4d/0x370 (?:?)
do_readlinkat+0x186/0x200 (?:?)
do_user_addr_fault+0x65a/0x890 (?:?)
__x64_sys_readlink+0x46/0x60 (?:?)
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: topology: Check PCM and DAI name strings before use
Topology objects store several PCM and DAI names in fixed-size UAPI
arrays. Other topology parser paths validate these fields with bounded
strnlen() checks before using them as C strings, but the PCM and DAI
paths still pass some fixed-size arrays directly to strlen(),
devm_kstrdup(), DAI lookup, and diagnostic prints.
A malformed topology blob with a non-NUL-terminated PCM, DAI, or stream
capability name can therefore make the parser read past the end of the
fixed-size field.
Reject unterminated PCM and DAI name fields before consuming them as C
strings. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/zcrypt: Fix buffer over-read in cca_cipher2protkey
Add validation of both the actual key buffer size and token length
fields in all the cca_check_sec*token() functions. Additionally check
in cca_gencipherkey() for possible underflow with returned key size.
The CCA token structures contain user-controlled len fields that
were used in operations without proper validation against both the
actual buffer size and minimum token structure size. An attacker
could set this field larger than the actual buffer size, leading to
reading beyond buffer boundaries. This may result in a kernel crash or
exposure of memory via sending this as part of a request down to the
crypto card. Also an attacker could have used a very small len value
and thus enforce a buffer under-run which may produce similar effects
as a over-read.
So now a key must
- key buf length must be at least sizeof the token struct
- the key len field inside the token must fit into the range of
sizeof key token struct ... key buf length |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: bound DACL dedup walk to copied ACEs
set_ntacl_dacl() can stop copying ACEs before consuming the full input
DACL when size accounting overflows.
When that happens, num_aces reflects only the ACEs that were actually
copied into the output DACL, but set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() still
receives nt_num_aces and uses it to walk the existing ACE array during
dedup.
That makes the dedup walk scan past the copied ACE array and inspect
buffer tail that does not contain valid ACEs.
Split the two meanings currently carried by the NT ACE count. Pass the
number of copied NT ACEs to bound the dedup walk, and preserve the
original "input DACL had NT ACEs" state separately for the
Everyone/default ACL fallback.
This keeps the dedup walk aligned with the ACEs that are actually
present in the rebuilt DACL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in OnAssocRsp() IE loop
The IE parsing loop in OnAssocRsp() advances by (pIE->length + 2) each
iteration but only guards on i < pkt_len. When a malicious AP sends an
AssocResponse whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame
(the element_id byte lands at pkt_len-1), the loop reads pIE->length
from pframe[pkt_len], which is one byte past the allocated receive buffer.
Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length
itself can extend the data window beyond pkt_len, silently passing a
truncated IE to the handler functions.
Add two guards at the top of the loop body:
1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header).
2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past pkt_len. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page
nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page() validates only the dword alignment
of the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo). The 64-bit offset is then
added to a small kzalloc'd buffer that holds the discovery log page
and the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which
memcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound
check:
u64 offset = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req->cmd); /* 64-bit host */
size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req->cmd); /* 32-bit host */
...
if (offset & 0x3) { ... } /* only check */
...
alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req);
buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL);
...
status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len);
The Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed()
returns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call
is reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach
the nvmet target. With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker
requesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next
slab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an
empirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81
canonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response). Pointing the
offset at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel memcpy and
crashes (or panics, on panic_on_oops=1) the target host instead.
The attacker-controlled source-side offset pattern
"nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + ATTACKER_OFFSET, ...)" is unique
to nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page in the entire nvmet codebase: every
other Get Log Page handler in admin-cmd.c either ignores lpo (and
silently starts every response at offset 0) or tracks a local
destination offset with a fixed source pointer.
Validate the host-supplied offset against the log page size, cap the
copy length to what is actually available, and zero-fill any remainder
of the host transfer buffer. The zero-fill matches the existing
short-response pattern in nvmet_execute_get_log_changed_ns()
(admin-cmd.c) and prevents leaking transport SGL contents when the
host asks for more bytes than the log page contains. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length
nvmet_auth_reply() accesses the variable-length rval[] array using
attacker-controlled hl (hash length) and dhvlen (DH value length) fields
without verifying they fit within the allocated buffer of tl bytes.
A malicious NVMe-oF initiator can craft a DHCHAP_REPLY message with a
small transfer length but large hl/dhvlen values, causing out-of-bounds
heap reads when the target processes the DH public key (rval + 2*hl) or
performs the host response memcmp.
With DH authentication configured, the OOB pointer is passed directly to
sg_init_one() and read by crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(), reaching
up to 526 bytes past the buffer. This is exploitable pre-authentication.
Add bounds validation ensuring sizeof(*data) + 2*hl + dhvlen <= tl before
any access to the variable-length fields.
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup/rstat: validate cpu before css_rstat_cpu() access
css_rstat_updated() is exposed as a BPF kfunc and accepts a
caller-provided cpu argument. The function uses cpu for per-cpu rstat
lookups without checking whether it refers to a valid possible CPU.
A BPF iter/cgroup program with CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON can pass an
invalid cpu value. On an unfixed UBSCAN_BOUNDS test kernel, cpu ==
0x7fffffff triggers:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in kernel/cgroup/rstat.c:31:9
index 2147483647 is out of range for type 'long unsigned int [64]'
Call Trace:
css_rstat_updated
bpf_iter_run_prog
cgroup_iter_seq_show
bpf_seq_read
Add cpu validation to the BPF-facing css_rstat_updated() kfunc and
move the common implementation to __css_rstat_updated() for in-kernel
callers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
security/keys: fix missed RCU read section on lookup
Nicholas Carlini reports that the keyring code calls assoc_array_find()
in find_key_to_update() without holding the RCU read lock, while the
assoc_array_gc() code really is designed around removing the node from
the tree and then freeing it after an RCU grace-period.
The regular key handling doesn't see this because holding the keyring
semaphore hides any lifetime issues, but the persistent key handling
uses a different model.
Instead of extending the keyring locking, just do the simple RCU locking
that the assoc_array was designed for. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Add upper bound check for num_of_nodes
drm/amdkfd: Add upper bound check for num_of_nodes
in kfd_ioctl_get_process_apertures_new.
(cherry picked from commit 98ff46a5ea090c14d2cdb4f5b993b05d74f3949f) |
