| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix incorrect FI_NO_EXTENT handling in __destroy_extent_node()
When __destroy_extent_node() sets the inode flag FI_NO_EXTENT, it does
not reset the length of the largest extent to 0 and update the inode
folio. Since modifications to the extent tree are disallowed afterward,
the cached largest extent may become stale. This can trigger the
following error in xfstests generic/388:
F2FS-fs (dm-0): sanity_check_extent_cache: inode (ino=1761) extent info [220057, 57, 6] is incorrect, run fsck to fix
In the f2fs_drop_inode path, __destroy_extent_node() does not need to
guarantee that et->node_cnt is 0, because concurrency with writeback
is expected in this path, and writeback may update the extent cache.
This patch reverts commit ed78aeebef05 ("f2fs: fix node_cnt race between
extent node destroy and writeback"), and remove the unnecessary zero
check of et->node_cnt. |
| In multiple functions of Helpers.java, there is a possible information disclosure due to improper input validation. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write
When updating an atomic-write file, f2fs_write_begin() may read the
previously written data back from the COW inode:
prepare_atomic_write_begin() locates the block in the COW inode and sets
use_cow, and the read bio is then built with the COW inode:
f2fs_submit_page_read(use_cow ? F2FS_I(inode)->cow_inode : inode,
...);
and f2fs_grab_read_bio() decides whether to schedule fs-layer decryption
(STEP_DECRYPT) for the bio based on that inode via
fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto().
However, the folio being filled belongs to the original inode
(folio->mapping->host == inode), and the data stored in the COW block was
encrypted (or left as plaintext) using the original inode's context, not
the COW inode's -- see f2fs_encrypt_one_page(), which keys off
fio->page->mapping->host. fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() likewise
operates on folio->mapping->host.
The COW inode is created as a tmpfile in the parent directory and inherits
its encryption policy from there. With test_dummy_encryption the newly
created COW inode gets the dummy policy and becomes encrypted, while a
pre-existing regular file -- created before the policy applied, e.g.
already present in the on-disk image -- stays unencrypted. The read
path then sets STEP_DECRYPT based on the encrypted COW inode and calls
fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() on a folio whose host (the unencrypted
original inode) has a NULL ->i_crypt_info, dereferencing it:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ...
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
RIP: 0010:fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks+0xa0/0x310
Workqueue: f2fs_post_read_wq f2fs_post_read_work
Call Trace:
fscrypt_decrypt_bio+0x1eb/0x340
f2fs_post_read_work+0xba/0x140
process_one_work+0x91c/0x1a40
worker_thread+0x677/0xe90
kthread+0x2bc/0x3a0
The COW inode is only needed to locate the on-disk block, and that block
address is already resolved into @blkaddr by prepare_atomic_write_begin()
via __find_data_block(cow_inode, ...); f2fs_submit_page_read() then reads
from that physical @blkaddr directly, so the inode argument only selects
the post-read crypto context, not which block is fetched. Reading with
@inode therefore returns the same (latest, not-yet-committed) COW data,
while making both the fs-layer decryption decision and the inline crypto
path use the correct (original inode's) key.
With the COW inode no longer used at the read site, the use_cow flag has no
remaining consumer; drop it from f2fs_write_begin() and
prepare_atomic_write_begin(). |
| In multiple locations, there is a possible out of bounds read/write due to an incorrect bounds check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.3 code execution was possible in untrusted projects via the Terraform File Watchers |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.3 host name verification was missing for server TLS certificates |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.3 command execution was possible via control characters in terminal command completion |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.3 blind SSRF was possible via remote references in JSON Schema validation |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.3 path traversal was possible via JSON Schema references in untrusted projects |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.3 sSRF was possible via custom plugin repositories |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.3 untrusted projects could trigger changes to GPG agent configuration |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.3 arbitrary file write was possible via symlinks when extracting plugin archives |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.3 code execution was possible via symlinks in an imported settings archive |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.3 hTML injection was possible in Remote Development editor tabs |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.3 code execution via the document import was possible in untrusted projects |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.3,
2026.2.4 stored XSS was possible on the built-in web server via Markdown preview |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.3 kotlin scripts could trigger dependency downloads from arbitrary repositories in untrusted projects |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.3,
2026.2.4 command execution via a hidden run control in the Markdown preview was possible |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.3,
2026.2.4 sSRF was possible via annotations.xml files during indexing |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.3 improper checks could enable disabled plugins via external dependency settings |
