| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.8, macOS Tahoe 26.7. An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: reject SetEA requests that do not fit the request buffer
CIFSSMBSetEA() copies the caller's extended attribute value into the
SMB request buffer without checking that it fits. The requirement is
stated in the source but was never implemented:
/*BB add length check to see if it would fit in
negotiated SMB buffer size BB */
/* if (ea_value_len > buffer_size - 512 (enough for header)) */
if (ea_value_len)
memcpy(parm_data->list.name + name_len + 1,
ea_value, ea_value_len);
The only bound applied on the way in is in cifs_xattr_set():
#define MAX_EA_VALUE_SIZE CIFSMaxBufSize
...
if (size > MAX_EA_VALUE_SIZE)
CIFSMaxBufSize is the full payload capacity of the buffer, so a value
of exactly that size leaves no room for the SMB header, the TRANS2
parameter block, the fealist header and the EA name that are written
ahead of it in the same object.
SendReceive() already enforces the correct limit on this very length:
if (in_len > CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE)
but it is called after the copy has taken place. An unprivileged
setxattr(2) on an SMB1 mount with a 250-byte name and a 16384-byte
value writes 16384 bytes starting 345 bytes into a 16588-byte
cifs_request object, ending 141 bytes past it:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in CIFSSMBSetEA+0xabc/0xde0
Write of size 16384 at addr ffff888003aa0159 by task init/68
__asan_memcpy+0x3c/0x60
CIFSSMBSetEA+0xabc/0xde0
cifs_xattr_set+0xd3a/0xff0
__vfs_setxattr+0x13e/0x1a0
The buggy address is located 345 bytes inside of
allocated 16588-byte region
Apply SendReceive()'s limit to the assembled request before the copy
rather than after it, and widen the byte counters so the sum cannot
wrap before it is tested.
byte_count is also tested against U16_MAX, because it is stored in the
16-bit pSMB->ByteCount. That becomes reachable when CIFSMaxBufSize is
raised at module load, where it may be set as high as 1024*127: with a
5-byte EA name and a 65521-byte value, count is exactly U16_MAX while
byte_count is 65556, and cpu_to_le16() would truncate it to 20 and
transmit a frame whose ByteCount does not match its length. Testing
byte_count covers count as well, since byte_count is the larger of the
two and count's only 16-bit consumer is written after this point.
check_add_overflow() is evaluated first so that total_len is assigned
before it is reported. |
| An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27.2. Mounting a maliciously crafted disk image may cause unexpected system termination or corrupt kernel memory. |
| An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27.2. Mounting a malicious disk image may cause unexpected system termination. |
| F´ (F Prime) is a framework that enables development and deployment of spaceflight and other embedded software applications. Prior to 4.2.0, Svc::FpySequencer STORE directive stack write validation the bounds check adds attacker-controlled offset and size before memcpy, allowing integer wraparound to make an out-of-range destination appear valid. When a sequence-controlled STORE directive supplies a stack offset and size whose U32 sum wraps, memcpy can write outside the sequencer stack, causing memory corruption, denial of service, and potentially code execution. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.0. |
| Wasmtime before 24.0.12, 25.0.0 before 36.0.13, 37.0.0 before 46.0.2, and 47.0.0 before 47.0.3 contains a type confusion vulnerability because several Store APIs fail to validate that objects belong to the Store's Engine. Embedders mixing objects between Engines via Instance::new, StructRefPre::new, or Tag::new can trigger trampoline signature mismatches causing out-of-bounds stack writes, GC heap corruption, or panics. |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 11.0.0 until 13.0.0, multi-frame loaders can retain an ImagingCore allocation created for a narrow frame mode while a later frame of the same dimensions changes the logical mode and decoder tiles to wider RGB or CMYK data. ImageFile.load_prepare() reuses the stale native storage because _im is non-null without verifying that its mode and size still match. Crafted PSD, MPO, DCX, or MIC frame transitions can then write wider pixels into the narrow allocation, causing native out-of-bounds writes and crashes. The MPO path can also cause a native over-read and, in demonstrated runtime-specific profiles, command execution. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0. |
| A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in Fireware OS's SIP proxy allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code by sending a specially crafted request through a policy that uses the SIP proxy. |
| NVIDIA PhysX for all platforms contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause an out-of-bounds write. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, data tampering, denial of service, information disclosure. |
| A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the Fireware OS logging service allows a network-adjacent attacker who can impersonate or intercept traffic to the configured log server to execute arbitrary code with root privileges by presenting a specially crafted certificate. |
| Wasmtime 39.0.0 before 48.0.4 and 49.0.0 before 49.0.2 contains a stack buffer overflow vulnerability that allows malicious guests to write ~16KB to the native stack via unvalidated async callback result types. Attackers can supply components with mistyped component-model-async callback functions to overwrite return addresses, crashing the host or escaping the sandbox. |
| CFITSIO through 4.7.0 contains an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in ffgcls2() in getcols.c that trusts attacker-controlled heap descriptor lengths for variable-length string columns. Attackers can supply a crafted FITS file that overflows a fixed 28,800-byte stack buffer and the caller's string array, enabling arbitrary code execution. |
| An out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the FireCluster Sync processing allows an attacker positioned on the cluster interconnect, such as a compromised cluster peer or an on-path network attacker, to repeatedly crash the firewall's cluster synchronization process by sending specially crafted network traffic, resulting in a sustained denial of service. |
| Dell PowerProtect Data Domain, Feature Release versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.8, LTS2024 release versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.80, LTS2025 release versions 8.3.1.0 through 8.3.1.40, LTS2026 release versions 8.6.1.0 through 8.6.1.20, contain an Out-of-bounds Write vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Denial of service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: sr: restore network header before routing and forwarding
ipv6_srh_rcv() runs with skb->data at the Segment Routing Header (SRH)
while skb_network_header() points at the IPv6 header.
When segments_left > 0, ipv6_srh_rcv() previously restored the skb->data
position by pushing sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), assuming the SRH immediately
followed the fixed IPv6 header. If another extension header (such as a
Hop-by-Hop options header) precedes the SRH, skb_network_offset()
remained negative.
This led to two problems:
1. During ip6_route_input(), fib6_rules_early_flow_dissect() invokes
__skb_flow_dissect() which passes the negative skb_network_offset()
to flow dissection, breaking BPF and C flow dissector logic.
2. If forwarded via ip6_forward() or redirected via act_mirred, downstream
handlers (like sch_fragment() or neighbour output) pass the negative
offset as an unsigned length, triggering OOB memcpy or buffer overflows.
Fix this by pushing -skb_network_offset(skb) before routing, ensuring
skb_network_offset(skb) is 0 for route lookup / flow dissection as well as
downstream forwarding. On the loopback path, pull skb_transport_offset(skb)
to restore skb->data to the SRH before looping back. |
| An Out-of-bounds Write vulnerability in the SSR TCP proxy/optimization path in Juniper Networks Session Smart Router allows an attacker to corrupt forwarded packet data and potentially cause a data-plane crash via a transit TCP packet with a crafted TCP option length. |
| An Out-of-Bounds Write vulnerability in the TCP header processing in Juniper Networks Session Smart Router allows an attacker to corrupt TCP payload data and potentially cause session desynchronization via a transit TCP packet with an oversized SACK option length. |
| The GPIO syscall handlers in drivers/gpio/gpio_handlers.c did not validate the pin argument supplied by a user-mode caller. z_vrfy_gpio_pin_configure(), z_vrfy_gpio_pin_get_config() and z_vrfy_gpio_pin_interrupt_configure() verified only the device object (K_SYSCALL_DRIVER_GPIO() / K_SYSCALL_OBJ()) and then passed the caller-supplied gpio_pin_t straight through to z_impl_gpio_pin_*() and on to the driver. The only pin check in include/zephyr/drivers/gpio.h was __ASSERT(gpio_port_pin_is_supported(cfg->port_pin_mask, pin), ...), which compiles to nothing unless CONFIG_ASSERT is enabled, so in a production build no check existed at all.
GPIO drivers use pin as a shift count and as an array index on the documented assumption that it is a pin the controller supports. On STM32, for example, gpio_stm32_pin_interrupt_configure() turns pin into an EXTI line and stm32_gpio_intc_set_irq_callback() writes data->cb[line_num].cb and data->cb[line_num].data into a NUM_EXTI_LINES-entry array (default 16) in drivers/interrupt_controller/intc_gpio_stm32.c, guarded only by a compiled-out __ASSERT_NO_MSG(); the same function then reads exti_irq_table[line_num] and calls irq_enable() on the result. Other controllers index fixed-size per-pin configuration tables the same way — drivers/gpio/gpio_ite_it8xxx2_v2.c reads an MMIO base pointer out of wuc_base[8] with the caller's pin and performs a read-modify-write through it.
The issue is reachable only in builds with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y (the file is compiled under that symbol), by a user-mode thread that has been granted access to a GPIO device object. Such a grant is intended to authorize control of that port's pins; the missing validation instead lets the thread drive a supervisor-mode out-of-bounds write of a function pointer and an associated void * past a kernel .bss array, and out-of-bounds reads that feed irq_enable() and MMIO accesses — an escape from the user-mode sandbox that can lead to kernel memory corruption, arbitrary code execution, or a crash.
The fix validates pin against the controller's gpio_driver_config.port_pin_mask with gpio_port_pin_is_supported() in every pin-taking z_vrfy_ handler and returns -EINVAL otherwise, complemented by an unconditional pin >= GPIO_MAX_PINS_PER_PORT range check added to the shared z_impl_gpio_pin_*() inlines. |
| ethernet_fill_header() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c can prepend the Ethernet header in place, by pushing it into the headroom of the packet's first fragment, instead of allocating a separate header fragment. Before this fix the in-place path was selected purely from the build-time value of CONFIG_NET_L2_ETHERNET_RESERVE_HEADER, with no check that the packet actually has that headroom, and then called net_buf_push(pkt->buffer, hdr_len). Only Ethernet TX allocations reserve that space: net_pkt_alloc_buffer() invokes the L2 alloc hook (ethernet_l2_alloc()) only when is_pkt_tx() is true and the packet's interface is the Ethernet interface.
A packet that was allocated by a different L2 and then handed to Ethernet for transmission therefore has too little (usually zero) headroom. Such packets are produced by ordinary routing and tunnelling paths: net_route_packet_if() re-targets a received packet to another interface when CONFIG_NET_IPV4_FORWARDING / CONFIG_NET_IPV6_FORWARDING are enabled (for example an 802.15.4/OpenThread or PPP interface forwarding to Wi-Fi/Ethernet), net_route_ipv6_mcast_forward_packet() forwards an RX-slab clone that carries no reserve, and the IPIP tunnel interface_send() prepends an outer IP header allocated on the virtual interface. In these configurations a remote or adjacent attacker triggers the condition simply by sending traffic that the device forwards.
Because net_buf_simple_push() only asserts on the headroom bound, a build without CONFIG_ASSERT (and without the newer CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING) moves the fragment data pointer below the start of its data block and writes 14 bytes — 18 with VLAN — of Ethernet header out of bounds. With the default fixed-size buffer pools this overwrites the tail of the neighbouring buffer's payload or memory preceding the pool array; with variable-size pools it overwrites the buffer reference count and the heap chunk header. The attacker controls neither the written bytes nor the offset, so the practical impact is memory corruption leading to a crash, packet corruption, or heap inconsistency rather than controlled code execution. The fix takes the in-place path only when net_buf_headroom(pkt->buffer) is large enough and otherwise falls back to a separate header fragment. |
| A segment fault (SEGV) flaw was found in libtiff that could be triggered by passing a crafted tiff file to the TIFFReadRGBATileExt() API. This flaw allows a remote attacker to cause a heap-buffer overflow, leading to a denial of service. |
