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Search Results (430617 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-99338 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 6.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: TDX: Enable Notify VM exit Enable Notify VM exit functionality for TDX guests. Notify VM exit is an existing feature supported by KVM. Userspace can enable Notify VM exit through KVM_CAP_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT when it's reported as supported. However, KVM reports the support of this CAP just based on the hardware capability but doesn't differentiate between VMX and TDX. This leads to the issue that userspace can enable this cap for TDX guests without getting an error, but the feature is not actually enabled because KVM doesn't call the TDX module API to program the relevant TD VMCS fields. Enable Notify VM exit for TDX guests by: - Invoking TDX module API calls to set NOTIFY_VM_EXITING and Notify Window in TD VMCS. It's done in tdx_vcpu_init() where other TD VMCS bits are set. Since TDX vCPU cannot be reset, it only needs to be configured once when initializing the TDX vCPU. - Adding corresponding exit handler for TDX Notify VM Exit. Notify VM exit can happen when executing the IRET instruction. If the IRET unblocks the NMI blocking state, bit 12 of the exit qualification is set. In this case, the VMM needs to restore the "blocked by NMI" state when it decides to re-enter the guest. For TDX, KVM cannot manage the GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO and it's TDX module's responsibility to handle it. Extract the common part without NMI blocking handling into a helper in common.h so that it can be shared between VMX and TDX. Note, KVM uses "pre-production" terminology for the feature formally called Notify VM-Exit. All public versions of the SDM refer to the feature as Instruction Timeout. This will be remedied in the near future, for now, use KVM's terminology for consistency. Note, #2, there is no enumeration bit for Notify VM exit by TDX module because all TDX modules support it, and allow to set the corresponding TD VMCS fields as long as the hardware supports the feature. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99339 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 3.3 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Zero reserved synic flags when delivering message to avoid stack leak Ensure all reserved flags are zeroed when setting the msg_pending flag as part of SynIC message delivery, as setting only msg_pending can leak seven bits of kernel stack data to the guest. E.g. gcc typically uses a bitwise-OR to set the msg_pending flag, without initializing the on-stack variable. Precisely zero the flags, e.g. as opposed to zeroing the entire structure, to make it somewhat more obvious that the flags *need* to be zeroed. E.g. it would be quite easy to misread the initial read of guest memory and think that zeroing the entire structure is completely superfluous. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99341 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Request event processing for exception VM-Exits Request event processing whenever kvm_queue_exception_vmexit() queues an exception VM-Exit. Most callers reach the helper through kvm_multiple_exception(), which already sets KVM_REQ_EVENT, but nested asynchronous page faults call it directly. Without another event request, vcpu_enter_guest() skips kvm_check_and_inject_events() and re-enters L2. A subsequent VM-Exit can clear the pending exception while reconstructing vectoring state, losing the synthetic #PF VM-Exit. The APF reason remains PAGE_NOT_PRESENT and a later regular #PF can consume the stale value. Setting KVM_REQ_EVENT in the common helper ensures that L1 receives the queued VM-Exit before KVM re-enters L2. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99342 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 6.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86/xen: Enforce 4-byte alignment of vcpu_info registration Xen's map_guest_area() enforces that vcpu_info is aligned to sizeof(xen_ulong_t). KVM has no such check, allowing a guest to register vcpu_info at an arbitrary byte alignment. Enforce unconditional 4-byte alignment regardless of the current shinfo mode. This is sufficient because subsequent commits ensure that all locked atomic operations on vcpu_info fields use at most 32-bit accesses. Return -ENXIO on failure, matching Xen's map_guest_area() behaviour for unaligned requests. Originally observed in review of an unrelated patch: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260604193554.1BA311F00893@smtp.kernel.org/ | ||||
| CVE-2026-99344 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 6.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: nSVM: Ignore EFER.LMA if EFER.LME=0 when preparing L2 state Force EFER.LMA=0 if EFER.LME=0 when preparing L2 state for VMRUN, i.e. mimic real hardware's behavior of ignoring EFER.LMA if EFER.LME=0. VMRUN unfortunately allows the nonsensical combination, i.e. doesn't fail, but KVM itself has an invariant EFER.LMA can be set et if and only if EFER.LME is set. Breaking that invariant can lead to a variety of issue, particularly in MMU code that keys off EFER.LMA when determining whether to emulate/virtualization 4/5-level paging versus PAE paging. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99347 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 6.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: x86: hdmi: fix chmap array missing terminator entry had_build_channel_allocation_map() allocates a single struct snd_pcm_chmap_elem via kzalloc() and stores it as intelhaddata->chmap->chmap. struct snd_pcm_chmap.chmap is expected to be a zero-terminated array (see snd_pcm_std_chmaps[]), but had_register_chmap_ctls() never overrides the TLV callback installed by snd_pcm_add_chmap_ctls(), so the generic pcm_chmap_ctl_tlv() from ALSA core is left in place. pcm_chmap_ctl_tlv() is reachable by any local user via SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_TLV_READ on the "Playback Channel Map" control and walks the array with "for (map = info->chmap; map->channels; map++)". Since the driver's single element is never terminated, this walks past the allocation. The same pointer is also freed on hot-unplug and rebuilt on hot-plug under intelhaddata->mutex, while the TLV callback runs under card->controls_rwsem without that mutex, so the walk can also race a concurrent free of the array. Fix this by allocating a second, zeroed element so the array is properly terminated, and by dropping the inherited TLV callback entirely at registration time, since the driver never implements one of its own. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99348 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 2.5 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: afs: Fix afs to abort the rxrpc call on send error Fix afs_send_empty_reply() and afs_send_simple_reply() to always try to abort the rxrpc call rather than just aborting on -ENOMEM and otherwise abandoning it. If the call is already complete due to network failure or a received abort, this will do nothing. Also make afs_make_call() always abort on send error; again, it does nothing if the rxrpc call is already dead. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99349 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 2.5 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix lack of short-send handling in rxrpc_kernel_send_data() Fix rxrpc_kernel_send_data() to loop around if it detects a short send. David Laight suggested doing it here rather than wrapping all the calls in loops. Further, remove the len argument and use the iterator count instead and return 0 on success, not the amount copied. Note this is also a prerequisite for changing the way rxrpc_send_data() works to return a short send rather than an error if some data was buffered. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99350 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix update of call->tx_pending without holding lock Currently, rxrpc_send_data() updates call->tx_pending just before it returns - but it won't be holding the call->user_mutex when it does this if a wait was interrupted by a signal. This would allow a parallel sendmsg() to race. Further, both the callers of rxrpc_send_data() call it with the lock held, and then it returns an indication through the parameter list to say whether it has dropped the lock or not - after which the callers both just drop the lock if it's still held. Fix this by: (1) Moving the release of call->user_mutex down into rxrpc_send_data() and get rid of the indicator parameter. This makes it easier to see where the lock is held. (2) After waiting, if the attempt to reacquire the mutex is interrupted, just return directly there rather than going to out_unlock (3) Restricting the txb variable to inside the buffering loop and leaving ->tx_pending set until we've queued the buffer. Note that there's a slight change in behaviour in that wait_for_space failure now doesn't check for completion because it doesn't hold the call user_mutex. The caller, however, should re-issue the send and pick up any error at a second attempt. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99351 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 3.7 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: treat empty auth.unix.gid replies as negative entries When rpc.mountd cannot resolve a uid (getpwuid() or getgrouplist() failure, e.g. while winbind or sssd is briefly unreachable), it answers the auth.unix.gid upcall with zero groups. unix_gid_parse() installs that as a valid positive entry, and svcauth_unix_set_client() then replaces the credential's group list with the empty one on every request, RPCSEC_GSS included via svcauth_gss_set_client(). One failed lookup strips that uid of all supplementary groups on every export for up to mountd's configured TTL (30 minutes by default), long after the NSS backend has recovered. mountd cannot send an empty list for a successful lookup, since getgrouplist(3) always includes at least the user's primary group, so a zero-group reply can only mean the lookup failed. Record it as a negative entry: unix_gid_find() then returns -ENOENT and svcauth_unix_set_client() keeps the groups the RPC credential already carries. This is the fallback that commit 3fc605a2aa38 ("[PATCH] knfsd: allow the server to provide a gid list when using AUTH_UNIX authentication") promised when no answer is available, and the same state try_to_negate_entry() already creates when no listener holds the channel open. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99352 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.9 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: trace an accepted transport before publishing it svc_handle_xprt() publishes a newly accepted transport before tracing it. svc_add_new_temp_xprt() places the transport on sv_tempsocks and clears XPT_BUSY, so another nfsd thread can dequeue it at once. If the peer has already closed the connection, that thread runs svc_delete_xprt(), which drops the list reference, the only reference the new transport holds. trace_svc_xprt_accept() then reads the transport's addresses and network namespace from freed memory. Before publication the accepting thread owns the transport exclusively: XPT_BUSY is still set from svc_xprt_init() and the transport is on no list. Emit the tracepoint there. [ cel: trace before publication instead of taking an extra reference ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-99353 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 4.4 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: Reject a socket that already has an svc_sock attached Writing the same socket descriptor to /proc/fs/nfsd/portlist twice attaches a second svc_sock to one socket. svc_setup_socket() saves the socket's callbacks before installing its own, so the second attach records svc_write_space() as the old write_space callback. svc_udp_init() invokes that callback by way of svc_sock_setbufsize(), and svc_write_space() then calls itself until the kernel stack is exhausted: BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc900037d7ff8 svc_write_space+0x90/0x2b0 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:429 svc_write_space+0xe6/0x2b0 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:430 ... 700 more ... svc_sock_setbufsize+0x18d/0x220 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:386 svc_udp_init net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:854 [inline] svc_setup_socket+0xb2f/0x1090 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:1498 svc_addsock+0x2fd/0x760 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:1547 __write_ports_addfd fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:742 [inline] write_ports+0xa5b/0xcc0 fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:861 nfsctl_transaction_write+0x106/0x1a0 fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:112 svc_data_ready() and svc_tcp_state_change() chain through their saved callbacks the same way, so a TCP descriptor added twice recurses on the next incoming segment instead. Reaching any of this takes a writer on portlist, and the nfsd filesystem sets no FS_USERNS_MOUNT, so the reproducer needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the initial user namespace. Reject a socket that already carries sk_user_data. svc_setup_socket() overwrites that field unconditionally, so a socket some other consumer has claimed is one NFSD would corrupt whether or not the callbacks recurse. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99354 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 4.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: pin gss module across auth_domain RCU free A gss auth_domain stores a raw pointer to svcauthops_gss in dom->flavour, and its release queues svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu() via call_rcu(). Both live in auth_rpcgss.ko text, and nothing pins the module while a domain referencing it is reachable. rmmod auth_rpcgss can therefore unmap that text while an NFSD export still holds a reference to the domain. The export cache is one such holder. When the export is finally released, the domain reference drops from module text: svc_export_put() auth_domain_put(exp->ex_client) auth_domain_release() dom->flavour->domain_release(dom) /* into module text */ svcauth_gss_domain_release() call_rcu(&dom->rcu_head, svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu) Once auth_rpcgss is unloaded, the domain_release call lands in unmapped memory. The rcu_barrier() in exit_rpcsec_gss() does not help: it waits only for callbacks already queued, and this one is not queued until the export goes away. NFSD's NFSv4 objects import symbols from auth_rpcgss.ko, so only a server built without CONFIG_NFSD_V4 can unload auth_rpcgss while exports still name a gss domain. Take a module reference in svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor() before publishing the domain and drop it at the end of svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu(). The rcu_barrier() then holds the module image until this callback has returned. [ cel: rewrote description ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-99357 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: Copy the deferred RPC Call from the head buffer svc_defer() snapshots the RPC Call for replay once a pending cache upcall resolves. It copies the Call starting (rq_arg.len - head[0].iov_len) bytes before head[0].iov_base, a back-up that once covered a transport header. No transport has had one since commit 983084b2672c ("SUNRPC: Remove svc_rqst::rq_xprt_hlen"), so the two lengths are meant to be equal. An RPCSEC_GSS Call breaks that assumption. Unwrapping the integrity service truncates rq_arg.len by the length of the trailing checksum, and unwrapping the privacy service leaves rq_arg.len short by an amount the client sets with trailing bytes after the wrap token. Neither adjusts head[0].iov_len. Both lengths are size_t, so the subtraction underflows and the copy starts past head[0].iov_base. Every deferred integrity Call replays a shifted snapshot. A deferred replay skips GSS verification, so a shifted snapshot runs as an authenticated Call. With the privacy service the offset is client-chosen. A forged Call placed in that window, naming another user's GSS context handle, runs under that identity. Copy the Call from head[0].iov_base. Refuse to defer a Call whose length runs past the head buffer, so the copy cannot read out of bounds. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99358 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.3 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: zero NFSv4 COMPOUND tag padding nfs4svc_encode_compoundres() copies the tag bytes into reserved XDR space and skips directly to the aligned end of the field. xdr_reserve_space() rounds the reservation up but does not initialize the padding bytes. A remote client can choose a tag length that is not a multiple of four, causing one to three stale bytes from the response page to be returned in the COMPOUND reply. Use xdr_encode_opaque_fixed() to copy the tag and clear its XDR padding. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99359 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 3.3 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: validate transport name in listener_set before serv creation nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() holds nfsd_mutex for the whole listener teardown and rebuild. The code checks NFSD_A_SOCK_TRANSPORT_NAME for presence only, and not for content. An arbitrary name therefore reaches svc_xprt_create_from_sa(). There, a name that matches no registered class calls request_module("svc%s", name). That call is a TASK_KILLABLE usermode helper upcall, and it runs under nfsd_mutex. Check the name against the classes that NFSD can create: tcp, udp and rdma. The check goes in nfsd_nl_validate_listeners(), which runs before the code takes nfsd_mutex. The rejection names the offending attribute through extack, since -EPROTONOSUPPORT on its own does not say which entry carried the bad name. This narrows the upcall. It does not remove it. NFSD accepts "rdma" without a condition, so on a kernel that does not build svcrdma the name still reaches request_module("svcrdma") under nfsd_mutex. That is necessary for the modular case, where the autoload is legitimate. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99360 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 4.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: Set nn->cld_net before registering the cld pipe rpc_mkpipe_dentry() instantiates the pipe's dentry before it returns, so the cld pipe can be opened as soon as nfsd4_cld_register_net() has run. __nfsd4_init_cld_pipe() does not store the new cld_net in nn->cld_net until after that call. cld_pipe_downcall() reaches the cld_net only through that pointer and takes cn_lock without checking it, so a write() that lands in the window oopses. Store nn->cld_net once @cn is fully initialized and before the pipe is registered, and clear it again when registration fails. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99361 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.9 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: propagate SETXATTR value decode errors nfsd4_decode_setxattr() stores the status returned while assembling a non-empty attribute value, but then unconditionally returns nfs_ok. An allocation failure can therefore leave a NULL value buffer paired with a non-zero length and allow compound processing to continue. Return the decoder status so that the operation stops on the original error. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99362 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: preflight SEQUENCE replies before accepting a slot nfsd4_sequence() narrows the reply buffer to the session's cached reply limit before it accepts the slot seqid. A client may negotiate ca_maxresponsesize_cached down to NFSD_MIN_HDR_SEQ_SZ, and nfsd4_alloc_slot() then gives every slot a zero-length sl_data[]. A COMPOUND tag can fill that narrowed buffer until it holds the SEQUENCE opcode but not the status word that follows. nfsd4_encode_operation() returns without running nfsd4_encode_sequence(), so cstate.data_offset stays zero. It leaves op->status at nfs_ok as well, so the COMPOUND is treated as having succeeded. nfsd4_store_cache_entry() declines to cache a lone SEQUENCE that returned an error. That test reads the status the operation reported, so it passes here. The copy starts at offset zero and takes the whole reply, RPC and COMPOUND headers included, into the zero-length sl_data[]. The COMPOUND tag is copied along with it, so the client picks most of the bytes written past the end of the slot: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_bytes_from_xdr_buf+0x1bc/0x390 Write of size 80 at addr ffff888003a549cd by task kunit_try_catch/24 __asan_memcpy+0x38/0x60 read_bytes_from_xdr_buf+0x1bc/0x390 nfsd4_sequence_done+0x5b0/0x810 nfs4svc_encode_compoundres+0x1bf/0x240 Check that the fixed-size SEQUENCE result, plus room for a following operation's error status, fits the negotiated limit before narrowing the buffer and consuming the slot seqid. The slot and its reply cache are left unchanged, as RFC 8881 Section 2.10.6.1.2 requires of an error returned from SEQUENCE. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99363 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 6.8 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: Map flex file layout IDs through the request's user namespace nfsd4_ff_proc_layoutget() and nfsd4_ff_encode_layoutget() translate the file's owner and group with init_user_ns, but every other identity nfsd places on the wire goes through nfsd_user_namespace(). When the transport carries a credential from a non-initial user namespace, the flex file layout reports host-global IDs. The client copies those IDs into the AUTH_SYS credential it presents to the data server, and svcauth_unix_accept() resolves that credential in the transport's namespace, so data server I/O runs under an identity unrelated to the file's owner. Switching to the request's namespace introduces a second hazard. from_kuid() returns (uid_t)-1 when the target namespace has no mapping for the owner, and the IOMODE_READ arm adds one to that result to derive an identity for which the data server denies writes. The addition would wrap to zero, handing the client uid 0 instead of an identity distinct from the owner. Translate both IDs in nfsd4_ff_proc_layoutget(), which has the svc_rqst, and carry the wire values in struct pnfs_ff_layout. from_kuid_munged() substitutes overflowuid for an unmapped owner and thus never returns (uid_t)-1, so the increment cannot wrap to zero. | ||||