| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Ratify is a verification engine as a binary executable and on Kubernetes which enables verification of artifact security metadata and admits for deployment only those that comply with policies the user creates. In a Kubernetes environment, Ratify can be configured to authenticate to a private Azure Container Registry (ACR). The Azure workload identity and Azure managed identity authentication providers are configured in this setup. Users that configure a private ACR to be used with the Azure authentication providers may be impacted by a vulnerability that exists in versions prior to 1.2.3 and 1.3.2. Both Azure authentication providers attempt to exchange an Entra ID (EID) token for an ACR refresh token. However, Ratify’s Azure authentication providers did not verify that the target registry is an ACR. This could have led to the EID token being presented to a non-ACR registry during token exchange. EID tokens with ACR access can potentially be extracted and abused if a user workload contains an image reference to a malicious registry. As of versions 1.2.3 and 1.3.2, the Azure workload identity and Azure managed identity authentication providers are updated to add new validation prior to EID token exchange. Validation relies upon registry domain validation against a pre-configured list of well-known ACR endpoints. EID token exchange will be executed only if at least one of the configured well-known domain suffixes (wildcard support included) matches the registry domain of the image reference. |
| Certain ASUS router models have authentication bypass vulnerability, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to log in the device. |
| Anyquery is an SQL query engine built on top of SQLite. Versions 0.4.3 and below allow attackers who have already gained access to localhost, even with low privileges, to use the http server through the port unauthenticated, and access private integration data like emails, without any warning of a foreign login from the provider. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.4. |
| YMS VIS Pro is an information system for veterinary and food administration, veterinarians and farm. Due to a combination of improper method for system credentials generation and weak password policy, passwords can be easily guessed and enumerated through brute force attacks. Successful attacks can lead to unauthorised access and execution of operations based on assigned user permissions. This vulnerability affects VIS Pro in versions <= 3.3.0.6. This vulnerability has been mitigated by changes in authentication mechanisms and implementation of additional authentication layer and strong password policies.
|
| A SAML library not dependent on any frameworks that runs in Node. In version 5.0.1, Node-SAML loads the assertion from the (unsigned) original response document. This is different than the parts that are verified when checking signature. This allows an attacker to modify authentication details within a valid SAML assertion. For example, in one attack it is possible to remove any character from the SAML assertion username. To conduct the attack an attacker would need a validly signed document from the identity provider (IdP). This is fixed in version 5.1.0. |
| cgi-bin/fdmcgiwebv2.cgi on Swissphone DiCal-RED 4009 devices allows an unauthenticated attacker to gain access to device logs. |
| Firefly III is a free and open source personal finance manager. In affected versions an MFA bypass in the Firefly III OAuth flow may allow malicious users to bypass the MFA-check. This allows malicious users to use password spraying to gain access to Firefly III data using passwords stolen from other sources. As OAuth applications are easily enumerable using an incrementing id, an attacker could try sign an OAuth application up to a users profile quite easily if they have created one. The attacker would also need to know the victims username and password. This problem has been patched in Firefly III v6.1.17 and up. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should Use a unique password for their Firefly III instance and store their password securely, i.e. in a password manager. |
| A flaw exists in the Windows login flow where an AuthContext token can
be exploited for replay attacks and authentication bypass. |
| A vulnerability in Imprivata Enterprise Access Management (formerly Imprivata OneSign) allows bypassing the login screen of the shared kiosk workstation and allows unauthorized access to the underlying Windows system through the already logged-in autologon account due to insufficient handling of keyboard shortcuts.
This issue affects Imprivata Enterprise Access Management versions 5.3 through 24.2. |
| In versions of Akana in versions prior to and including 2022.1.3 validation is broken when using the SAML Single Sign-On (SSO) functionality. |
| Pocketbase is an open source web backend written in go. In affected versions a malicious user may be able to compromise other user accounts. In order to be exploited users must have both OAuth2 and Password auth methods enabled. A possible attack scenario could be: 1. a malicious actor register with the targeted user's email (it is unverified), 2. at some later point in time the targeted user stumble on your app and decides to sign-up with OAuth2 (_this step could be also initiated by the attacker by sending an invite email to the targeted user_), 3. on successful OAuth2 auth we search for an existing PocketBase user matching with the OAuth2 user's email and associate them, 4. because we haven't changed the password of the existing PocketBase user during the linking, the malicious actor has access to the targeted user account and will be able to login with the initially created email/password. To prevent this for happening we now reset the password for this specific case if the previously created user wasn't verified (an exception to this is if the linking is explicit/manual, aka. when you send `Authorization:TOKEN` with the OAuth2 auth call). Additionally to warn existing users we now send an email alert in case the user has logged in with password but has at least one OAuth2 account linked. The flow will be further improved with ongoing refactoring and we will start sending emails for "unrecognized device" logins (OTP and MFA is already implemented and will be available with the next v0.23.0 release in the near future). For the time being users are advised to update to version 0.22.14. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
|
| A vulnerability was found in Papendorf SOL Connect Center 3.3.0.0 and classified as problematic. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the component Web Interface. The manipulation leads to missing authentication. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| The RingCentral Communications plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass due to improper validation within the ringcentral_admin_login_2fa_verify() function in versions 1.5 to 1.6.8. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any user simply by supplying identical bogus codes. |
| Captive Portal can allow authentication bypass |
| Improper Authentication vulnerability in Snow Software AB Snow License Manager on Windows allows a networked attacker to perform an Authentication Bypass if Active Directory Authentication is enabled.This issue affects Snow License Manager: from 9.33.2 through 9.34.0.
|
| A vulnerability has been identified in SENTRON 7KM PAC3200 (All versions). Affected devices only provide a 4-digit PIN to protect from administrative access via Modbus TCP interface. Attackers with access to the Modbus TCP interface could easily bypass this protection by brute-force attacks or by sniffing the Modbus clear text communication. |
| ArmorX Android APP's multi-factor authentication (MFA) for the login function is not properly implemented. Remote attackers who obtain user credentials can bypass MFA, allowing them to successfully log into the APP. |
| The Xiaomi Security Center expresses heartfelt thanks to Ken Gannon and Ilyes Beghdadi of NCC Group working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative! At the same time, we also welcome more outstanding and professional security experts and security teams to join the Mi Security Center (MiSRC) to jointly ensure the safe access of millions of Xiaomi users worldwide Life. |
| The web application uses a weak authentication mechanism to verify that a request is coming from an authenticated and authorized resource. |
| A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, has been found in Gowabby HFish 0.1. This issue affects the function LoadUrl of the file \view\url.go. The manipulation of the argument r leads to improper authentication. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. |
